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For nearly a century the term „fundamentalism‟ has referred primarily to a set of specific 
Christian beliefs and an allied ultra-conservative attitude. However, usage of the term has 
broadened: „fundamentalism‟, as a term indicating the position of a „closed mind‟ coupled 
with a negative – even hostile – stance toward the status quo, has migrated into political 
discourse and the wider religious realm.  
 
Fundamentalism broadly names a religio-political perspective found in most, if not all, 
major religions. Most disturbingly, it is now associated with variant forms of religious 
extremism and thus religiously-oriented terrorism. And it is Islamic modalities of 
terrorism that, rightly or wrongly, have come to take centre-stage in current world affairs.  
 
This lecture will argue that the religious fundamentalism with which Islamist extremism 
is associated follows an identifiable paradigm that has wider applicability. Religious 
„fundamentalism‟ denotes, among other things, a paradigm that paves the way from the 
relative harmlessness of an idiosyncratic and dogmatic belief system, to the harmful 
reality of religiously driven and fanatically followed pathways to terrorist activity. The 
lecture will attempt to describe and analyse this paradigm with reference to contemporary 
concerns.  
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Broadly speaking, the term „fundamentalism‟ today names a religio-political 
perspective found in most if not all major religions in the contemporary world.
2
 At 
the present time it is associated with various expressions of religious extremism 
and, most worryingly, with religiously-motivated terrorism.
3
 In particular – 
though by no means exclusively – it is Islamic extremism and allied terrorist 
activities which are linked in our day to the idea of fundamentalism. Although 
both Christianity and Islam are susceptible to imperialist impositions of one sort 
or another, as history only too clearly has demonstrated, it is nonetheless the case 
that it is Islamic modalities of extremism and terrorism which have presently 
taken centre-stage in current world affairs. While there have been many studies 
undertaken on so-called Islamic fundamentalism,
4
 the fact remains that it and, 
indeed, religious fundamentalism, in general, are much misunderstood within the 
public arena, at least in the West. The term itself tends to evoke a negative 
reaction of some sort; we none of us nowadays regard it with indifference. But 
what are we to make of it? 
 
Since mid-2005 I have had cause to reflect on, and critically think through, the 
relationship between religious fundamentalism and contemporary religiously 
motivated terrorism. This lecture revisits, and further refines and extends, some 
initial work.
5
 In my view it is imperative to attempt to critically understand any 
potential – let alone real – relationship between fundamentalism and terrorism. It 
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is, I suggest, the contemporary religious challenge, without equal. International 
travel, national economies – the price we pay for our petrol – are all impacted 
today not so much by the convolutions of foreign policies and international 
relations, or even by global economic and political power plays, as such. Rather it 
is competing and impositional religious ideologies, taken to extreme, that 
presently impinges on all our lives and constitutes a defining feature of our times. 
An upsurge in the totalising claims of fundamentalist ideologues – in Islam, 
certainly, but also in Christianity, as well as in Hinduism, Judaism and other 
religious communities – together with the utilisation of globalized 
communication, transportation and related modern technologies, means that the 
issue of religious fundamentalism requires careful consideration and critical 
analysis.  
 
I contend that the fundamentalism with which Islamist extremism is associated 
arguably follows an identifiable paradigm that has a wider purview.  Given the 
contemporary pressing need to be able to identify, predict, locate and so counter 
any potential terrorist extremism born of certain intense expressions of religion, 
usually identified in some way as „fundamentalist‟, then the task of analysing the 
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism so as to construct a paradigm capable of 
providing both interpretation and, perhaps, a measure of predictability, would 
seem an imperative task. It is this task I seek to address. In order to do so I shall 
review the definition and meaning of the term „fundamentalism‟, discuss some 
aspects of the issue of fundamentalism and terrorism with specific reference to the 
current Islamic context of it, then proffer my own analysis of religious 
fundamentalism so as to show the interconnecting complexities of an ideological 
paradigm that allows for a progression from the particularities of a religious belief 
system to the commitment of atrocities in the name of that system. 
 
Fundamentalism: the genesis and meaning of a term 
In its Christian religious context, the term „fundamentalism‟ originated in 
America. A series of booklets, issued during the second decade of the twentieth-
century and simply titled The Fundamentals, was published to promote the view 





 From the proposition that Christianity rests on this set of fundamental 
doctrines there arose, inter alia, the use of the term „fundamentalism‟ to refer to 
the generic idea proposed by the publication of the booklets. At the time the badge 
of „fundamentalism‟ was proudly worn: true religion was combating the inroads 
of a destructive liberalism. Subsequently, „fundamentalism‟ has achieved a wider 
application and attracted considerable academic interest.
7
 One very significant 
study in this regard was the five-year „Fundamentalism Project‟ which 
commenced in 1987. It was sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences and, during the 1990s, led to the publication of several substantial 
volumes.
8
 These showed that religious fundamentalism can imply a narrow, strict 
and limited metaphysics and set of doctrines, which to a greater or lesser degree 
hardly impinge on the wider life of a society; or it can mean a worldview 
perspective that engenders, if not demands, the advocacy of a socio-political 
ordering and action to achieve an intended outcome. Further, these studies showed 
that an imagined „golden-age‟, believed to have pertained at the religion‟s 
foundation, is held up in the context of a fundamentalist position as the model and 
reference point for contemporary reality. Also, in response to the possible critique 
that religion, and in particular fundamentalist religion, is but an epiphenomenon 
riding on what are really political ideas and actions, or that fundamentalism is 
really just a passing fad, such studies have only served to highlight what 
subsequent history and recent events underscore: that religious fundamentalism is 
a deeply rooted phenomenon that can give rise to, rather than simply feeds upon, 
political acts. 
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However, the wider use of the term „fundamentalism‟ has not been without 
problems and difficulties. It does not transfer well into religious contexts other 
than Christian, and it is imprecise enough even within the Christian camp. 
Nevertheless, the term has gained wide coinage and we have to live with it and 
utilise it as best we can. In a nutshell, „fundamentalism‟ is today often defined in 
terms of what it is „against‟. In a general sense it is used as “a pejorative 
description for anyone who is regarded as having a closed mind with regard to a 
particular issue”.9 And a key difference between religiously-driven political 
actions today, in contrast with any previous point in history, is the pervasive 
context of globalisation. Instead of localised, even regional, levels of action, the 
technology and mentality of a globalized world now allow for a degree of 
internationalisation of the ideologies and activities of so-called fundamentalist 
movements as never before. 
 
If recent events tell us anything, it is that religion, especially in its fundamentalist 
forms, must not be taken lightly or dismissively ignored. The surrealistic drama of 
hijacked aeroplanes assaulting the grand edifices of modernity may have been 
replaced by the more pervasive and insidiously terrorising small-scale targeting of 
transportation infrastructure and the innocents of the cities who happen to be there 
at the explosive moment, or the making of all travellers virtually everywhere – 
and certainly if going to, or via, America – to be regarded by airport security 
services as potential bombers. But what is the outcome? There may be an 
associated rhetoric of the meting out of punishment in respect to a purported 
transgressing of divine justice, but even this serves to reinforce the fact that this is 
but a petulant terrorism enacted out of what can only be described as a frustrated 
fundamentalism: the temper tantrums of a cognitively challenged worldview; the 
descent of a religious ideal into the clutches of criminality. In reality the 
calculated randomness of such anarchic activities can achieve no other end than 
the fomenting of disorder and social panic. And to the extent we comply and 
acquiesce – albeit in the name of „security and safety‟ – the terrorist project enjoys 
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a measure of success. But let us now look a little closer at the issue of 
fundamentalism and terrorism, especially with regard to Islam. 
 
Fundamentalism and Terrorism 
One contemporary commentator, Tariq Ali, offers an insightful critique.
10
 In 
regard to the so-called war against terror, he categorises the current contest as 
occurring between two fundamentalist trajectories. On the surface, one is 
religious, namely the Islamic world, and the other political, namely America, or 
the Americanised, globalized, and secularised West. This latter, in Ali‟s view, is 
characterised by a shameless use of disproportional military power and the former 
by a carefully targeted fanaticism. Ali‟s fundamental thesis is that the 
predominating dynamic in world affairs is a clash of fundamentalisms, religious 
and political, and in both realistic and idealistic senses. What is being played out 
in Iraq, for instance, involves a combination of political and religious 
fundamentalisms as both real and idealised systems. The political ideal invoked in 
respect to the invasion was that of a Western „coalition of the willing‟ contending 
with the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein. The ostensible aim was to liberate 
the world from fear of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But there also emerged 
– especially as these weapons seemed highly elusive – the aim of liberating the 
Iraqi people from political oppression in order, among other things, to obtain 
religious freedoms. Such were the idealised rationales for war. 
 
On the overtly religious side, the ideal espoused was that there was no attack 
intended on religion as such. Saddam Hussein may have happened to be Muslim, 
but it was not Islam per se that was the target. Yet the promotion of freedom to be 
religious within Iraq – that is, to be able to freely follow the religion of one‟s 
choosing – together with the making of positive overtures to a diversity of 
religious leadership within the country, was offered as inherently part of the 
overall „change-management‟ dimension of the invasion plan. Thus, despite 
protestations to the contrary, the conflict may be cast in religious terms as yet 
another clash of the West‟s secularised Judeo-Christian religious system with that 
of Islam per se, and, of course, winning yet again. This is an ideal perceived to be 
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the case by some cadres, at least, of Christian fundamentalists in the West. This is 
especially so in the US with respect to the American New Religio-political Right, 
which had been relatively dormant since the Reagan years, and which re-emerged 
in the context of the election, and re-election, of President George W. Bush. This 
ideal, whether perceived or manifest, of the superiority of a conservative Christian 
West winning over Islam has clearly been viewed as a threatening reality, one that 
demands to be actively resisted, by many Muslims the world over. More 
pointedly, it reinforces a general fundamentalist viewpoint – that is found in both 
Christian and Muslim fundamentalist variants – that pitches Islam and Christianity 
as eternal adversaries. Much the same fundamentalist scenario holds for Islam and 
the Jews, as any survey of contemporary Islamic and ultra-orthodox Jewish 
rhetoric would testify.  Which side is regarded as ultimately victorious depends on 
the religion espoused by the fundamentalist. The rules of engagement are the same 
either way. God/Allah will guarantee the ultimate victory: the believer is simply 
enjoined to fight the good fight. 
 
But the war on terror is a war of ideology; in particular, a war against the 
dominance of certain religious fundamentalisms. The key is that religious 
terrorism derives from an ideology of religious fundamentalism. An English 
newspaper commentator, writing in the aftermath of the London bombings of July 
2005, seemed to get the point. Rather than taking up arms in the so-called “war 
against terrorism” the real issue was recognised as having to do with the “battle to 
discredit an ideology … it is an idea that caused the attack, and it is the idea that 
must be undermined”.11 Authorities in England were soon reported to be 
“examining literature for clues to the precise ideology” that may have inspired the 
London bombers.
12
 Of course, by virtue of being “extremists”, individuals who 
carry out terrorist atrocities are properly disowned by the community of faith with 
which they are otherwise identified. Their actions are condemned as un-Islamic, 
as contrary to Quranic dictate, and inimical to normative Islam. Investigations into 
the London bombings revealed that as far back as January 2005 there was 
mounting concern within the young men‟s own Muslim communities that their 
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hardening fundamentalist and extremist attitudes and opinions were taking them 
far beyond the pale of normative Islam. Indeed, they had been ostracised and told 
they were not welcome in certain mosques because of their advocacy of 





Alongside rejection of aberrant behaviour, there is also a direct and outright denial 
by some – possibly many – from within the Islamic community of any Muslim 
link to such a situation in the first place. Attempts to redirect responsibility 
elsewhere, including claiming the attacks were the work of America or Israel, are 
not unknown. Such paradoxical and absolute denial of Islamically-driven 
terrorism, by Muslims, is based on an ideological stance which goes, in effect: 
„Given that such terrorism harms Muslims and besmirches Islam, any true Muslim 
could not possibly commit it.‟ This line of thought surfaced after the 9/11 attacks 
when a Muslim mentality of denial led to rumours of Jewish conspiracy theories 
as the root cause not Islamic disaffection, let alone an Islamic ideology as such. 
Straws of denial and deflection were being desperately clutched at by some. As 
Waleed Aly has remarked: 
 
An emotive confusion drives denial and this is demonstrated by the 
inconsistency of the reasoning that accompanies it. Too often, those who 
deny that Muslims are in any way responsible for terrorism also blame a 
belligerent Western foreign policy towards Muslim nations for the 
terrorist backlash. Such Orwellian doublethink destroys the necessary 




On the one hand there is a refusal, on ideological grounds, to believe fellow-
Muslims could commit such acts of terrorism; on the other hand Islamic 
extremists will target Muslim and non-Muslim alike on equally ideological 
grounds. So what is driving contemporary globalized Islamic extremism and 
terrorism? Is it just a contemporary socio-political aberration in a religious guise? 
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Are these little more than the anarchists of our age? Arguably, a potential measure 
of the propensity to terrorism can be identified in terms of a scrutiny of certain 
forms of Muslim rhetoric, namely when there is unequivocal advocacy of the view 
that, vis-à-vis an Islamic context „passive oppression‟ has been eclipsed by an 
intentional „active oppression‟ against Muslims and Islam. An example of the 
former would be the British foreign policy of non-action in Kashmir or Chechnya; 
and of the latter its active involvement in the war in Iraq. 
 
That is to say, military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq or wherever – the so-
called „war on terror‟ or whatever else may be deemed to express „active 
oppression‟ – may be taken by Muslims as, indeed, acts against Islam itself. So, 
acts against Muslims in a specific context are translated into acts conducted 
against Islam generally and universally, thereby calling forth and legitimating, 
qua the logic and rhetoric of jihad, an aggressive Islamic response. Where such 
rhetoric of advocacy and argumentation is fomented there may well be a case for 
pre-emptive countering action on the part of the authorities concerned. The 
problem, of course, is that such action only reinforces the rhetoric. 
 
If a clutch of media reports following recent atrocities, and even police actions to 
intercept the actors before they act, are anything to go by, it would seem local 
moderate Muslim communities appear unable to foresee the possibility of terrorist 
activities emanating from their midst. This suggests that there is a very real 
difficulty for religious people to understand the range of ideological options, and 
the significance of the shifts that occur in an individual‟s ideological stance, from 
within their own religion. This would seem acutely the case for Muslim 
communities right now, but should in no way be deemed a uniquely Muslim issue. 
But where does all this leave the wider society? How are we to address the 
challenge of fundamentalism and terrorism? The primary component in any 
strategy aimed at countering religiously motivated terrorism, I suggest, has to be 
in respect to identifying, and addressing, ideological rhetoric and elements within 
communities from which potential terrorists are likely to come, and by which they 
are likely to be nourished. But to do that, to make sense of any potential data or 
evidence, we need a framework of interpretation, a lens of perspective. It is in 
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respect to this that we now turn to an analysis of religious fundamentalism as 
offering a paradigm for terrorism. 
 
Religious Fundamentalism as a paradigm for terrorism 
Both Christianity and Islam have within their history and ideology a paradigm for 
an approved, even sanctioned, death: martyrdom. Yet in both cases the root idea 
of martyrdom was a death that provided, or was in itself, the occasion of 
witnessing for the faith. The root meaning of the Greek-derived „martyr‟ and the 
Arabic „shahid‟ was the same: a witness to the faith, and in both cases the 
originating context was that of a legal connotation.
15
 Dying in the defence of 
one‟s faith community, or as a consequence of persecution because of one‟s faith 
identity, soon emerged as a specialised meaning, thus reserving the respective 
terms to mean willing preparedness to be killed for the sake of one‟s faith. In 
neither case has suicide or murder ever been normatively sanctioned as a 
component to, or the equivalent of, martyrdom.
16
 But it would seem that today, 
something has changed – at least in respect to certain forms of Islamic extremism 
wherein the willingness to die, to be killed, for one‟s faith has been extended to 
embrace both active self-killing (suicide) and the killing of others (murder).  
 
If there has been an ideological shift taking place, even if only within the more 
extreme forms of Islam for example, what has allowed this to occur? In a nutshell 
the answer is fundamentalism, but it would be an injustice to assume that it is the 
direct result of fundamentalism per se. Rather it is something about 
fundamentalism as such which, applied to certain Islamic contexts for example, 
allows for such development. But it is clear that the terrorist use of martyrdom is 
by no means peculiar to Islam.
17
 Kamikaze pilots of World War II and Tamil 
Tigers in the late 20
th
 century are two examples that lie outside the Muslim 
domain. Yet in all cases it can be argued that a form or paradigm of religious 
fundamentalism – whether Shinto, Buddhist,18 Hindu or Islamic, among others – 
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provides the key to understanding the motivation and the modality. 
Fundamentalism is both a specifically focussed mindset and a certain kind of 
narrow worldview, a modus operandi, which can apply to just about any sphere of 
human activity, but especially so to religion and politics, for both are concerned 
with the context and aims of human existence. So it is to the paradigm of 
fundamentalism that I now turn.  
 
As a framework phenomenon that applies to more than just religion, 
fundamentalism is comprised, I suggest, of at least fourteen key factors. Others 
may be adduced, but these fourteen, and the way they are interconnected, need to 
be carefully understood. For it is these features, collectively and cumulatively 
which, I suggest, move a fundamentalist mindset from the quirky to the critical, 
from atavism to aggression, from benign eccentricity to socially endangering 
activity. The factors I have identified are analysed in terms of seven sets of paired 
features.
19
 I contend it is the particular sequential combination of these factors 
which is important, not just the elements themselves. 
 
Set 1 – Principal Presuppositions:  
(i) Perspectival Absolutism and (ii) Immediate Inerrancy 
The fundamentalist perspective is inherently absolutist: all other relevant 
phenomena are simply explained on its terms, or viewed in a relativising way with 
reference to it. Fundamentalism, as a mindset, is first and foremost a mentality 
that expresses the modernist project writ large: only one truth; one authority; one 
authentic narrative that accounts for all; one right way to be. And, of course, that 
way is my way, declares the fundamentalist. Further, the fundamentalist 
perspective deems itself privileged in respect to this absolutism, for it implies 
superiority of knowledge and truth. Indeed, this is inherent to holding an 
absolutist perspective as such. Absolutism of outlook or worldview is a mark of 
fundamentalism, but not of itself a signal of potential terrorist activity in respect 
of that worldview. That comes later. 
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Allied to absolutism is the view that the grounding text – be it political manifesto 
or holy writ – is to be read as conveying an immediate truth or value, without 
error; that is, inerrant. However, the assertion of the immediate inerrancy of the 
text – that is, reading the text as being immediately applicable and providing a 
non-mediated access to ultimate or divine truth – in fact involves an implicit 
assertion that there is only one normative interpretive reading allowed, namely 
that which is undertaken through the fundamentalist‟s lens. A fundamentalist‟s 
presumption of textual immediacy and inerrancy is, of course, but one interpretive 
option. Nevertheless, from the fundamentalist perspective, alternative and variant 
interpretations are deemed inherently false or heretical, and so are rejected. 
 
These two interconnected factors – perspectival absolutism and immediate 
inerrancy – comprise the foundational or principal presuppositions of religious 
fundamentalism which, on their own, might simply indicate one among many 
options for the expression of religious belief. Most often a secularist, an agnostic, 
or a religious liberal in the West would likely view these factors to be the essence 
of fundamentalism: an atavistic expression of religion, a quirky mindset, a rather 
odd out-of-step religious mentality, proof positive that religion amounts to little 
more than fairy-tales. Easily ignored, best avoided, of no consequence or 
significance in the greater scheme of things. But, I contend, this is not all there is 
to fundamentalism.  
 
Set 2 – Authority Derivation: 
(iii) Apodicity Assumption and (iv) Narrow Narrative Indwelling 
Building directly upon the preceding set, the third and fourth factors of my 
analysis of fundamentalism constitutes the basis of authority claimed by 
fundamentalism as such, namely, in the first instance, the assumption that the 
authority source, most usually textual is unambiguous thus requiring no 
interposing hermeneutic.
20
 This is sometimes understood in terms of „literalism‟, 
but for a fundamentalist the key issue is that the authority of the text is such that 
no intermediary interpretive framework is required – the text itself provides 
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pellucid expression of truth, whether in terms of an abstract universal, or in 
respect to a pragmatic or programmatic articulation of the values and views 
espoused by the fundamentalist as the truth. This provides the authorisation 
underlying the preceding presupposition of immediate inerrancy.  
 
Paradoxically, of course, any so-called „literalist‟ reading, or regarding a text as 
not requiring any intentional hermeneutical application, is itself a modality of 
interpretation, namely a fundamentalist one. It is often assumed, by a 
fundamentalist, that a „direct‟ reading of the text can be made so as to avoid the 
murky waters of interpretation; that is, there is no need to apply any sort of 
intellectual critique or scrutiny of the text: meaning can be immediately read off; 
the text at hand is clear in its composition; the message conveyed by the text is 
apodictic. Not so. The fundamentalist makes the assumption that meaning and 
truth can be directly read without recourse to a frame of meaning that supplies a 
key to understanding. Again, not so: every so-called fundamentalist reading of the 
Bible, the Qur’an, or whatever, necessarily requires a prior held framework of 
understanding about the nature of the text and the meanings of the key terms and 
concepts employed.  
 
Nevertheless, allied to the assumption of apodicity is the factor of narrow 
narrative indwelling. Arguably all religious people „indwell‟, to a greater or lesser 
degree, their respective religious narrative. The life references, points of meaning 
and frameworks of understanding which inform a religious individual‟s existence 
are more often than not traceable to the paradigms, models, values and so on, that 
are given within the religious narrative – the scriptural record as well as ancillary 
histories/stories and so forth – than derived from the intellectual ratiocination of 
doctrine and dogma. Where the narrative base is broad, the religious life that 
indwells therein likewise reflects breadth. But where the base is narrow, the 
resultant indwelt religious life is correspondingly confined. So my thesis is that, in 
the case of fundamentalism, a distinguishing factor has to do with the narrowness 
of narrative indwelling. It is, indeed, this very narrowness which often marks a 
fundamentalist out from the wider religious tradition and community which, in 
contrast, will have a tendency to admit a wider reading of its narrative and a 
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capacity to indwell it in respect to symbolic meanings and aesthetic allusions, for 
instance, with a measure of interpretive flexibility.  
 
Set 3 – Contextual Scope:  
(v) Ideological Exclusivism and (vi) Polity Inclusivism 
Fundamentalism‟s third set includes two factors which, in their apparent 
paradoxical juxtaposition, yield the scope of the context of fundamentalism. The 
first is ideological exclusivism wherein, because there is only one reading, only 
one interpretation, of the grounding text allowed, the ideological view expressed 
therein, or built thereon, is inevitably an exclusive one. No competing or variant 
ideological view is granted credibility. A fundamentalist perspective will exclude, 
virtually automatically, anything that relative to it appears „liberal‟, that is, that 
admits of, for example, any limitation, provisionality, otherness, openness or 
change. Religious fundamentalism excludes religious liberalism. Similarly, 
secular fundamentalism often excludes religion per se on the same sorts of 
grounds. Ideological exclusivism works in multiple directions. 
 
But alongside this exclusivity there may be discerned, as a sixth factor to 
fundamentalism, a form of inclusion, namely polity inclusion. This is the 
propensity to include, in respect to considerations of the policies and praxis of 
social organisation, all others that fall within the fundamentalist‟s frame of 
reference or worldview understanding. This may still appear innocuous, especially 
if the fundamentalists concerned are a minor or marginalised group in terms of the 
wider society in which they exist, or where such an inclusivist stance finds a more 
benign setting within a normative or orthodox religious tradition. Nevertheless, in 
terms of this paradigm analysis, the fundamentalist, for whom polity inclusiveness 
is a primary element, is now poised to become activist – to act on this inclusivism 
in terms of polity, whether covertly (as in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
Saints vicariously baptising the dead) or overtly (as in the Taliban‟s insistence that 
everyone in Afghanistan live according to their application Islam, and variations 




So, the apparent paradox of fundamentalism evincing both exclusivism and 
inclusivism as two of its core features is resolved. Excluding all other ideological 
variants and perspectives necessarily implies the wholesale inclusion of a society 
in terms of the outworking of polity considerations. Thus, for example, the 
fundamentalism of a resurgent Islamist perspective naturally insists not just that 
all Muslims should live according to Islamic Law, but that all members of the 
society in question, irrespective of religion, should likewise submit to this Law 
Code – understood, of course, to transcend human values and codes by virtue of 
being “God‟s law” – or be made so to do. We hear of this call being issued by 
Islamic activists from time to time in different parts of the Muslim world; we may 
indeed find some expressions of it closer to home, albeit if only wistfully, or 
merely in principle, entertained. 
 
Set 4 – Identity Structure: 
(vii) Communitarian Intent and (viii) Individual Constraint 
The fundamentalist mindset is not simply a matter of opinion and perspective as 
held by an individual, or by a collective of individuals. Arguably, fundamentalism 
per se tends to embrace a particular dynamic wherein there is given expression to 
what we may call a „communitarian‟ intent, on the one hand, symbiotically 
juxtaposed with some form of „constraint‟ placed upon the individual who is a 
member of that community, on the other. The identity of a fundamentalist 
individual is bound up necessarily with the identity of the fundamentalist 
community. Indeed, the stronger the fundamentalism, the tighter this relation 
which, I suggest, comprises the identity structure of fundamentalism.  
 
The factor of „communitarian intent‟ denotes the way in which fundamentalist 
movements place value, to a greater or lesser degree, upon membership of the 
community, and the upholding of its values and norms, as essential to the 
community such that the identity of individuals within the community is thereby 
proscribed. Thus the factor of „individual constraint‟ is the necessary corollary, 
and the two factors go together to form the structure of fundamentalist identity, 
irrespective of the specific religion. Many examples can be adduced to make the 
point; that of the Exclusive Brethren, which has been in the headlines recently, 
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may suffice. With respect to the Islamic idea and ideal of the ummah – that notion 
of community which roughly parallels the Christian concept of „ecclesia‟ – 
membership of it is essential, not voluntary, for the muslim individual such that 
withdrawal from the community on account, for example, of a change in 
individual religious identity, is viewed as apostasy: a treasonable offence 
attracting severe sanction in some quarters. To this extent Islam presents as a 
fundamentalist religion per se – which in many respects it is. But that does not 
mean Islam is necessarily inherently violent. Nevertheless, this set of factors, to 
the extent they are legitimately part of a paradigm arguably may contribute, in the 
end, to a predisposition and justification of violent behaviour. Of course, this has 
been the case, historically, for Christianity, at least in the form of Western 
Christendom. And there are Christian denominations and sects for whom the 
essential dynamic of fundamentalist identity structure would certainly apply. 
 
Set 5 – Implicit Verification: 
(ix) Narrative Correlation and (x) Rhetorical Corroboration 
Principal presuppositions granted, the derivation of authority established, the 
contextual scope adumbrated and identity demarcated, the evolving 
fundamentalist perspective begins now to move from a variant conservative 
expression of a religious worldview to a more intentional advocacy of religious 
viewpoint as being, par excellence, the expression of authenticity and truth 
applicable for, or to, all. This comes about, initially, with the deepening of the 
correlation between the religious narrative espoused and the reality, or sitz-im-
leben, of the religious community concerned. Any phenomenology of religion will 
be able to articulate some such measure of narrative correlation as an otherwise 
quite normal feature of religion as such. That is to say, normatively a religion will 
proffer some degree of correlation between its narrative and the „real world‟ in 
which the followers of the religion live – otherwise religion would reduce to a 
simple and obvious fairy-tale. However, a distinction can be made between the 
broader traditions of a religion whose narrative correlation will be relatively loose, 
flexible or at least provisional, and the fundamentalist whose degree of correlation 
will be that much greater and intense. Indeed this factor sharpens – and is prefaced 
by – the factors of absolutism and inerrancy. For a fundamentalist the correlation 
 
17 
will be such as to yield an unambiguous outcome – America is the Great Satan, 
ontologically, for example – whereas, for a non-fundamentalist critical of the 
West, America may be deemed or judged satanic in a more general way. The 
difference is one of the degree of correlation between the religious narrative and 
the external realities of the world in which the fundamentalist lives. 
 
Allied to narrative correlation is the factor of rhetorical corroboration. Here the 
discourse of fundamentalism can be more readily tested, perhaps. For in the 
articulation of narrative correlation there is likely to found a corresponding 
intensification of a corroborating rhetoric that situates, endorses, and justifies the 
fundamentalist perspective vis-à-vis the judgements and assessments made about 
the external world in terms of narrative correlation. Rhetoric will be sharp and 
self-affirming; judgements will be clear and reflective of both the correlation 
factor as well as the corroboration factor. Thus the perspective of the 
fundamentalist derives implicit verification and the scene is set for the next step, 
namely the application of the values espoused from out of the fundamentalist‟s 
narrative. 
 
Set 6 – Value Application: 
(xi) Otherness Negated and (xii) Self-Superiority Asserted 
At this stage in the development of a fundamentalist‟s outlook the sense of self-
affirmation and confidence is such that the values of fundamentalism are actively 
and intentionally applied. And these values are primarily two: the negation of 
otherness or alterity, and the corresponding assertion of self-superiority over all 
opponents, real and putative. The negation of otherness is perhaps critical at this 
juncture for the scene set by the third set of factors – the contextualising 
exclusivism and inclusivism – now emerge into a devaluing and dismissal of the 
„other‟, whether in terms of rival community or competing alterities, ideological 
or otherwise. Indeed, such alterities may be – and in fact often are – demonised. 
The religiously „other‟ on this view is often cast as „satanic‟, or at least seriously 
and significantly labelled as a hostile opponent, and so hostilely regarded. In the 
process of negating the other, the self is asserted as inherently superior. My God is 
greater than your god. My Truth reigns over your ignorance. The authenticity of 
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my faith contrasts with the feeble delusion you entertain. My laws express the 
divine reality directly which is infinitely superior to the laws which derive merely 
from human ideas. The salvation offered by my faith is the real thing by contrast 
to the lost way that you proclaim. And so we might go on. However it is 
expressed or referenced, it will be clear enough that the fundamentalist is applying 
the key value set of negativity to „otherness‟ and a corresponding assertion of self-
superiority. The scene is now well set for the seventh and final set of factors I 
have analysed as the components of the paradigm of fundamentalism – the 
rendering of an explicit justification not just for a viewpoint but also for actions 
premised on that viewpoint. 
 
Set 7 – Explicit Justification:  
(xiii) Sanctioned Imposition and (xiv) Legitimated Extremism 
It should be clear that, once the preceding sets of factors are in operation, it is but 
a short step to the final two, which denote the expression of fundamentalism in 
some form of direct socio-political action. For the thirteenth factor sees the very 
imposition of the fundamentalist‟s views and polity as, in fact, sanctioned by a 
higher or greater authority – whether that authority is conceived in terms of deity 
or the dynamics of historical necessity. This reference transcends the local, 
particular, ordinary taken-for-granted freedoms of everyday life with the 
requirement to be, live and do in accord with the fundamentalist‟s ideological 
dictates.  
 
The sanctioning of the imposition of the fundamentalist‟s programme leads 
naturally to the fourteenth and final factor of this analysis: extremist action is now 
legitimated. Once there is in place a sense of transcendent sanction for 
programmatic action, the way to the legitimising extreme behaviours to achieve 
the requisite outcomes is eased. Japanese kamikaze pilots and Palestinian suicide 
bombers are two examples – now „classical‟ in terms of recent history – of the 
outworking of the features of fundamentalism that culminate in extreme actions. 
More complexly, as we have recently seen in Afghanistan, not only was it the case 
that all good Muslims ought to submit naturally to the Shari’a, according to the 
fundamentalist ideals of the Taliban, but indeed all of society should be made to 
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submit, like it or not, for impositional submission is an inherent element of 
Islamic extremism. Submission to the dictates of the fundamentalist is at this 
juncture a matter of necessary imposition, as Afghani women found to their cost, 
for example. And the alternative to even an involuntary submission is outright 
destruction: hence, from the Taliban‟s extremist perspective, the Buddha „idols‟ 
had to be destroyed. How else does the extremist ensure that the imposition that 
has been sanctioned can actually be effected? Sanctioned imposition and 
legitimated extremism are the two sides of the one coin in the currency of terror. 
 
Conclusion 
Fundamentalism is not simply a religious or even political option in terms of 
belief perspective. It is a package-deal phenomenon denoted by a sequence of 
factors whose cumulative impact once – or if – the seventh Set is reached, can be 
devastating. The Taliban, to turn to this example of Islamic fundamentalist 
extremism, took an absolutist, inerrant and exclusivist line with respect to their 
religious identity and behaviour, which was extended to include all who were 
within their purview – namely, the inhabitants of Afghanistan. Actions taken to 
effect their aims were deemed sanctioned by the highest authority – Allah (or 
God) – and their extreme measures were in consequence deemed legitimated. 
Thus no opposition was brooked; all had to submit and obey, or face the 
consequences. To the extent my analysis of the paradigm of religious 
fundamentalism per se is in any way apposite and accurate, and to the extent that 
empirical evidence – derived for example from speeches, pamphlets etc. – can be 
adduced such that there is a clear correlation with the paradigmatic elements as I 
have outlined them, then I suggest that this provides a basis, at least, for an 
empirical measure for the detection of extremist religious fundamentalism – 
Islamic as well as any other – likely to lead to terrorist activity. Of course, 
religious fundamentalism per se does not necessarily lead to terrorism. There are 
examples aplenty of religious fundamentalists who are pacifist in outlook and 
demeanour, including the vast majority of Muslims. But fundamentalism may lead 
to terrorism; and in some cases it does. Hopefully this paradigm analysis will help 
explain why, and assist in the process of addressing it. 
